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August 2007
LAWYER PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITIGATION
BY PROFESSOR JEFFREY W. STEMPEL
A perennially-vexing litigation issue concerns the limits of permissible attorney
argument. More than a few lawyers have been tripped up by the occasional fuzziness of
the line between aggressive advocacy and improper appeals to passion or prejudice. See
Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An
Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 67 (2001-2002)(problem
of violations results from lack of uniformity and clarity of ground rules as well as errors
of counsel). In Cohen v. Lioce, 149 P.3d 916 (Nev. 2006) the Nevada Supreme Court
both provided significant guidance in this area and also fired a metaphorical “warning
shot” to counsel.
The implication of Cohen v. Lioce are particularly significant for personal injury defense
counsel, who are often retained by insurers who may have an interest in pushing counsel
to make arguments consistent with insurer public relations efforts to disparage lawsuits
and the extent of plaintiff injuries in minor impact automobile accidents or other claims
toward which insurers may take a particularly “hard line” regarding defense and
settlement. Conversely, plaintiff’s counsel should realize that the court’s heightened
interest in policing attorney conduct at trial logically limits use of appeals to juror
sympathy, stereotypes about business or insurer defendants, or lawsuits as a means of
wealth distribution or enhancement of social welfare. Distilled to its essence, Cohen v.
Lioce provides cautionary warnings to trial counsel.
First, personal opinion and “vouching” for witnesses or facts is out-of-bounds, as has
long been the case in Nevada and most jurisdictions (149 P.3d at 929). Second, attorney
appeals for jury nullification are forbidden (149 P.3d at 928). The court adopted the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of jury nullification as a jury’s “knowing and
deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law either because the jury
wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or
because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or
fairness.” See 149 P.3d at 928, quoting Black’s at 875 (8th ed. 2004). Similarly, a third
lesson of Cohen v. Lioce is that references to material outside the record and
characterizing the outside world in relation to the lawsuits can create problems for
counsel, but standards in this area are not entirely clear.
Fourth, so-called “golden rule” arguments are forbidden (149 P.3d at 929-930). A golden
rule argument is one that asks the jurors to imagine themselves in position similar to that
of the plaintiff and to decide the case according to what they would have done or wanted
in response to the situation (149 P.3d at 930). Ordinarily, golden rule arguments are used
by plaintiff’s lawyers to ask for substantial pain-and-suffering damages or other relief by
asking jurors to empathize with an injured victim. But in one of four cases consolidated
for review by the court in the Cohen v. Lioce opinion, a defense attorney used the golden

rule tactic to ask jurors to put themselves in plaintiff’s position and imagine themselves
rejecting litigation on the ground that the incident was trivial or something for which
another party could not reasonably be blamed.
Fifth, attorney misconduct during a closing may result in a new trial depending on the
circumstances. Further, the presence or absence of an objection can be important. Where
there is objection to closing argument, the party seeking a new trial must demonstrate
“that the misconduct’s harmful effect could not be removed through any sustained
objection and admonishment.” See 149 P.3d at 919. Where there is no objection, the
trial court “may grant a motion for a new trial only if the misconduct amounted to plain
error,” meaning that in the absence of the misconduct, the verdict would have been
different.” See 149 P.3d at 919.
Sixth, trial counsel’s improper closing argument may result not only in a new trial but
also in disciplinary action. However, in Cohen v. Lioce, the court found counsel’s
“continued use and expansion” of “improper arguments” an indication that the
misconduct was deliberate. Id. The court concluded that counsel’s conduct in two cases
“warrants monetary sanctions” and all four cases referred offending counsel to the state
bar “for disciplinary proceedings.” See 149 P.3d at 931-932.1
In four personal injury cases (Castro v. Cabrera, Seasholtz v. Wheeler, Lang v.
Knippenberg, and Lioce v. Cohen), three involving “minor” impact automobile collisions
and one involving a dog biting an infant under the dog owner’s care, defense lawyer
Phillip Emerson was extraordinarily successful in obtaining defense verdicts,2 using
essentially the same closing argument in all four cases. Emerson’s closing emphasized
his personal view that the plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous and that he had a “passion” for
defending such cases because of their societal implications. He also suggested that such
frivolous cases were common and presented a severe economic and social problem for
the nation, state, and judicial system that jurors would help solve by ruling against the
instant plaintiffs. See 149 P.3d at 918-22 (reproducing problematic portions of
argument).3
The four losing plaintiffs sought new trials, which were granted in two of the cases.
Appeals followed. The asserted grounds for a new trial focused on the alleged
impropriety of Emerson’s closing statements. The Supreme Court agreed that “because
defense counsel’s closing arguments encouraged the jurors to look beyond the law and
the relevant facts in deciding the cases before them . . . they amounted to misconduct.”
See 149 P.3d at 919.
The “New” Law of Lawyer Closing Arguments: Standards, Objections, and Review
Lioce v. Cohen essentially establishes a two-track standard for reviewing claims of
prejudicial attorney misconduct. If there is a timely objection to improper closing
argument (or presumably to any other attorney misconduct at trial), the objecting party
may use the misconduct as the basis for a new trial if it can demonstrate that the
misconduct has a harmful effect that cannot be removed by the objection and court

remedial efforts such as an admonishment to counsel or a curative instruction. However,
if there is no objection to an improper closing argument (or other misconduct of counsel),
the party seeking a new trial must prove “plain error” in order to get a new trial. This
means that the moving party must shoulder the burden to prove that without the
misconduct, the jury’s verdict would have been different. In ruling upon these types of
new trial motions, district courts must make express fact findings on these points so that
the Supreme Court can evaluate the grant or denial of a new trial motion according to the
standards set forth in Cohen v. Lioce. See 149 P.3d at 919.4
In the case of misconduct without objection, the party seeking a new trial “bears the
burden of demonstrating that the misconduct is so extreme that the objection and
admonishment could not remove the misconduct’s effect.” When objection and
admonishment are “insufficient to remove the attorney misconduct’s effect, a new trial is
warranted.” See 149 P.3d at 926. In cases where objection has been made:
the party moving for a new trial based on that purported attorney misconduct
must first demonstrate that the district court erred by overruling the party’s
objection. If the district court concludes that it erred by overruling the
objection, the district must then consider whether an admonition to the jury
would likely have affected the verdict in favor of the moving party. In this, the
court must evaluate the evidence and the parties’ and attorneys’ demeanors to
determine whether a party’s substantial rights were affected by the court’s
failure to sustain the objection and admonish the jury.
See 149 P.3d at 926.
Cases of persistent attorney misconduct with repeated or continuing objection present “a
more complex issue.”
[W]hen the district court decides a motion for a new trial based on repeated or
persistent objected-to misconduct, the district court shall factor into its analysis
the notion that, by engaging in continued misconduct, the offending attorney
has accepted the risk that the jury will be influenced by his misconduct.
Therefore, the district court shall give great weight to the fact that single
instances of improper conduct that could have been cured by objection and
admonishment might not be curable when that improper conduct is repeated or
persistent.
See 149 P.3d at 927.
Cohen v. Lioce does not change the longstanding general rule that failure to object to
improper closing argument (or most anything else at trial) normally constitutes a waiver
by the party failing to object. However, in cases of “plain error,” the trial court may
review the question of misconduct even absent objection. According to the Supreme
Court:

[T[he proper standard for the district courts to use when deciding a motion for a
new trial based on unobjected-to attorney misconduct is as follows: (1) the
district court shall first conclude that the failure to object is critical and the
district court must treat the attorney misconduct issue as having been waived,
unless plain error exists. In deciding whether there is plain error, the district
court must then determine (2) whether the complaining party met its burden of
demonstrating that its case is a rare circumstance in which the attorney
misconduct amounted to irreparable and fundamental error. In the context of
unobjected-to attorney misconduct, irreparable and fundamental error is error
that results in a substantial impairment of justice or denial of fundamental
rights such that, but for the misconduct, the verdict would have been different.
See 149 P.3d at 927.
On review of a trial court decision regarding a new trial motion, the grant or denial of the
motion is reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard. “Whether an attorney’s
comments are misconduct is a question of law [which is reviewed] de novo” but with
“deference to the district court’s factual findings and application of the standards to the
facts.” See 149 P.3d at 928. “When ruling on a motion for a new trial based on attorney
misconduct, district courts must make express factual findings” applying the above
standards. See 149 P.3d at 919. The Court further noted that attorney misconduct need
not be intentional to require a new trial. “The relevant inquiry is what impact the
misconduct had on the trial, not whether the attorney intended the misconduct.” See 149
P.3d at 931.
Particular Problems to Avoid in Closing Argument
Jury Nullification
According to the court, there were several problems that qualified as impermissible
summation and attorney misconduct. The court found the Emerson closing arguments
constituted improper appeals for jury nullification because they:
[s]uggested to the jurors that, regardless of the evidence, if the jury found in the
defendants’ favors, the jury could remedy the social ills of frivolous lawsuits.
Essentially, Emerson asked the jury to “send a message” about frivolous
lawsuits. His arguments were directed at causing the jurors to harbor disdain
for the civil jury process– a defining, foundational characteristic of our legal
system– and at perpetuating a misconception that most personal injury cases
are unfounded and brought in bad faith by unscrupulous lawyers. These
arguments are irrelevant to the cases at hand and improper in a court of law and
constitute a clear attempt at jury nullification.
See 149 P.3d at 928.
The court did not develop the relevance point at length, characterizing the use of

references to material outside the case record (e.g, the prevalence of frivolous litigation,
the volume of greedy plaintiffs, the costs to society, the rapaciousness and avarice of
lawyers) as part of the jury nullification issue. However, one could re-characterize much
of this problem with the Emerson closing arguments as a problem resulting from
counsel’s injection of extra-record material designed to prejudice the jury. One can view
this impermissible reference to material outside the record as the crux of the problem
with the Emerson summations. The law of limitations on this type of conduct should be
more developed by Nevada courts. A dispute is supposed to be decided on the facts of
record before the jury. Absent court supervision, juries are not permitted to visit accident
sites or to conduct their own experiments attempting to recreate or test theories of
causation and liability. Cases are decided on the merits of the particular dispute as
determined by the evidence of record in court. When counsel asserts that there is a
particular state of things outside the courtroom that should impact the jury’s verdict,
counsel is in effect urging the jury to decide the case based on the attorney’s asserted
extra-record facts about the outside world and society. Emerson’s closing arguments can
be viewed as asserting that, for the world at large, all minor impact, soft-tissue
automobile injury cases were without merit and that improper-supervision-of-pets cases
are simply strike suits by parents trying to cash in on a child’s disfigurement. But
Emerson presented no evidence that his purported state of the world was accurate.
Indeed, we are all told in law school that attorney arguments are not evidence, much less
admissible, persuasive evidence. Emerson was asking the jurors to reject the plaintiffs’
claims on the ground that the world is full of baseless claims rather than because the
particular claims before the court were without merit.
Consider if the shoe was on the other foot and a prominent plaintiff’s attorney were to tell
the jury during closing argument that outside the courtroom, on a regular basis,
corporations were poisoning the environment or cooking the books or cheating the IRS.
What if plaintiff’s counsel asserted that insurance companies were united in stonewalling
claimants in order to make more money, or that drug companies regularly hid adverse test
results to gain FDA approval? This type of closing argument is improper because it
seeks the jury’s favor not on the basis of the instant litigants and the evidentiary record in
the case, but instead seeks to win based on painting a picture of the outside world that
may or may not be accurate and which may or may not be similar to the instant case. Just
as sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, plaintiff and defense lawyers alike should
be prohibited from these kinds of prejudicial closing arguments or similar behavior at
trial. Every plaintiff and each defendant is entitled to have the jury decide their dispute on
the merits of the trial record, not upon a picture of the outside world painted by counsel
or the media.
Attorney Personal Opinion
The Cohen v. Lioce Court then addressed the issue of the interjection of a lawyer’s
personal opinion in a case, which is somewhat different from the problem of a lawyer
introducing extra-record material or attempting to assert a set of facts not established at
trial. Noting that Nevada Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.4(e) forbids counsel from
stating personal opinions about the merits of a case, witness credibility, or culpability, the

court-reviewed prior case law and noted that attorney statements of personal opinion are
not only improper but may “amount to prejudicial misconduct necessitating a new trial.”
See 149 P.3d at 929. Emerson’s closings met this standard because of his professed
personal “passion” for the cases and his assertions that he was involved in a “personal
crusade to defend his clients. By representing to the jury his personal opinion that the
plaintiffs’ cases were worthless, Emerson not only violated his ethical duties, he also
prejudiced the jury against the plaintiffs.” See 149 P.3d at 929.
Golden Rule Arguments
The court then addressed the “golden rule” objection to the Emerson summation made in
Lang v. Knippenberg.
In Lang, Emerson asked the jury to consider whether, if the jurors’ children were injured
at a slumber party, they would merely consider that an accident or see it as an opportunity
to sue. Emerson impliedly asked the jurors to consider what remedies the jurors would
pursue for the accident and inferred that the jurors would not consider litigation.
*

*

*

He invited the jurors to make a decision as if they and their children were involved in his
hypothetical situation – a situation that somewhat paralleled the scenario of the Langs’
daughter’s injuries. This question indicated that the jury could make a decision based on
the personal hypothetical, designed to trivialize the daughter’s injuries instead of deciding
the case on negligence law and the evidence that the Langs and Knippenberg presented.
Thus, Emerson’s comment amounted to an impermissible golden rule argument.
See 149 P.3d at 929-930.
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Lawyer Professional Responsibility in Litigation (footnotes)
1 Justice Paraguirre, concurring and dissenting in part, disagreed with “the
scope of the sanctions imposed” in two of the cases. He would have addressed
the sanctions issue by seeking more information through a trial court
proceeding ordering counsel to “show cause why sanctions should not be

imposed.” See 149 P.3d at 932.
2 So extraordinarily successful that in one of the cases (Seaholtz v. Wheeler), the
defendant had admitted liability and was contesting only the amount of damages. But
after hearing Emerson’s summation, the jury rendered a total defense verdict of no
liability and denied recovery even for medical bills that were not contested by the
defendant. See 149 P.3d at 930.
3 According to Emerson,
[A]t some time, at some point we must say, enough is enough.
People must take responsibility for their lives and not blame others
for challenges and setbacks. People must stop wasting taxpayers’
money and jurors’ valuable time on cases like this.
See 149 P.3d at 923 (quoting Emerson summation in Seasholtz v. Wheeler). Emerson’s
summation in Lioce v. Cohen was similar. See 149 P.3d at 912.
4 The Supreme Court had previously issued important opinions on attorney trial
misconduct in Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (Nev. 1995), DeJesus v.
Flick, 116 Nev. 812, 7 P.3d 459 (2000), and Ringle v. Bruton, 120 Nev. 82, 86 P.3d 1032
(Nev. 2004). After Lioce v. Cohen, all three of these cases must be viewed with caution
or treated as superceded.
After reviewing our prior jurisprudence, we conclude that Barrett’s
permeation rule is incomplete and that DeJesus’s “inflammatory
quality and sheer quantity” test is unworkable. Accordingly, the rule
and test in those opinions are overruled. While we approve of
Ringle’s “plain error” test for unobjected-to misconduct, its
application is limited to an examination of whether “no other
reasonable explanation for the verdict exists” except for the
misconduct.
	
  

